The positions of the Allied armies stretched from southern France all the way north to the netherlands. German planning for the counteroffensive rested on the premise that a successful strike against thinly manned stretches of the line would halt Allied advances on the entire western Front. 46 Operation names edit The wehrmacht 's code name for the offensive was Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein Operation Watch on the Rhine after the german patriotic hymn die wacht am Rhein, a name that deceptively implied the germans would be adopting a defensive posture along. The germans also referred to it as "Ardennenoffensive" (Ardennes Offensive) and Rundstedt-Offensive, both names being generally used nowadays in modern Germany. The French (and Belgian) name for the operation is Bataille des Ardennes (Battle of the Ardennes). The battle was militarily defined by the Allies as the Ardennes counteroffensive, which included the german drive and the American effort to contain and later defeat. The phrase battle of the bulge was coined by contemporary press to describe the way the Allied front line bulged inward on wartime news maps. While the Ardennes counteroffensive is the correct term in Allied military language, the official Ardennes-Alsace campaign reached beyond the Ardennes battle region, and the most popular description in English speaking countries remains simply the battle of the bulge.
All quiet on the western Front
Hitler originally set the offensive for late november, before the anticipated start of the russian winter offensive. The disputes between Montgomery and Bradley were well known, and Hitler hoped he could exploit this disunity. If the attack were to succeed in capturing Antwerp, four complete armies would be trapped without supplies behind German lines. 44 :19 several senior German military officers, including Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model and Gerd von use Rundstedt, expressed concern as to whether the goals of the offensive could be realized. Model and von Rundstedt both believed aiming for Antwerp was too ambitious, given Germany's scarce talent resources in late 1944. At the same time, they felt that maintaining a purely defensive posture (as had been the case since normandy) would only delay defeat, not avert. They thus developed alternative, less ambitious plans that did not aim to cross the meuse river (in German and Dutch: maas model's being Unternehmen Herbstnebel (Operation Autumn Mist) and von Rundstedt's Fall Martin Plan Martin. The two field marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to hitler. E f When they offered their alternative plans, hitler would not listen. Rundstedt later testified that while he recognized the merit of Hitler's operational plan, he saw from the very first that "all, absolutely all conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking." 44 :24 Model, commander of German Army Group B (Heeresgruppe. In the west supply problems began significantly to impede Allied operations, even though the opening of the port of Antwerp in late november improved the situation somewhat.
Although he realized nothing significant could be accomplished in the eastern Front, he still believed an offensive against the western Allies, whom he considered militarily inferior to the red Army, would have some chances of success. Hitler believed he could split the Allied forces and compel the Americans and British to settle for a separate peace, independent of the soviet Union. Success in the west would give the germans time to design and produce more advanced weapons (such as jet aircraft, new U-boat london designs and super-heavy tanks ) and permit the concentration of forces in the east. After the war ended, this assessment was generally viewed as unrealistic, given Allied air superiority throughout Europe and their ability to continually disrupt German offensive operations. Given the reduced manpower of their land forces at the time, the germans believed the best way to seize the initiative would be to attack in the west against the smaller Allied forces rather than against the vast soviet armies. Even the encirclement and destruction of multiple soviet armies, as in 1941, would still have left the soviets with a numerical superiority. Citation needed hitler's plan called for a classic Blitzkrieg attack through the weakly defended Ardennes, mirroring the successful German offensive there during the battle of France in 1940—aimed at splitting the armies along the. S.—British lines and capturing Antwerp. 44 The plan banked on unfavorable weather, including heavy fog and low-lying clouds, which would minimize the Allied air advantage.
This fuel shortage intensified after the soviets overran those fields in the course of their August 1944 Jassy-kishinev offensive. One of the few advantages held by the german forces reviews in november 1944 was that they were no longer defending all of Western Europe. Their front lines in the west had been considerably shortened by the Allied offensive and were much closer to the german heartland. This drastically reduced their supply problems despite Allied control of the air. Additionally, their extensive telephone and telegraph network meant that radios were no longer necessary for communications, which lessened the effectiveness of Allied Ultra intercepts. Nevertheless, some 4050 messages per day were decrypted by Ultra. They recorded the quadrupling of German fighter forces and a term used in an intercepted Luftwaffe message—jägeraufmarsch (literally "Hunter Deployment —implied preparation for an offensive operation. Ultra also picked up communiqués regarding extensive rail and road movements in the region, as well as orders that movements should be made on time. Drafting the offensive edit hitler felt that his mobile reserves allowed him to mount one major offensive.
36 :1 Adolf Hitler first officially outlined his surprise counter-offensive to his astonished generals on September 16, 1944. The assault's ambitious goal was to pierce the thinly held lines of the. First Army between Monschau and Wasserbillig with Army Group B ( Model ) by the end of the first day, get the armor through the Ardennes by the end of the second day, reach the meuse between liège and Dinant by the third day, and. 37 :164 38 Hitler initially promised his generals a total of 18 infantry and 12 armored or mechanized divisions "for planning purposes." The plan was to pull 13 infantry divisions, two parachute divisions and six panzer-type divisions from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht combined German military. On the eastern Front, the soviets' Operation Bagration during the summer had destroyed much of Germany's Army Group Center (Heeresgruppe mitte). The extremely swift operation ended only when the advancing soviet Red Army forces outran their supplies. By november, it was clear that soviet forces were preparing for a winter offensive. Meanwhile, the Allied air offensive of early 1944 had effectively grounded the luftwaffe, leaving the german Army with little battlefield intelligence and no way to interdict Allied supplies. The converse was equally damaging; daytime movement of German forces was rapidly noticed, and interdiction of supplies combined with the bombing of the romanian oil fields starved Germany of oil and gasoline.
All quiet on the western Front
This had the short-term goal of opening the urgently needed port of Antwerp and the long-term goal of capturing the ruhr area, the biggest industrial area of Germany. With the Allies stalled, german Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Gerd von Rundstedt was able to reorganize the disrupted German armies into a coherent defence. Field Marshal Montgomery's Operation Market Garden achieved only some of its objectives, while its territorial gains left the Allied supply situation stretched further than before. In October, the first Canadian Army fought the battle of the Scheldt, opening the port of Antwerp to shipping. As a result, by the end of October the supply situation had eased somewhat.
German plans edit despite a lull along the front after the Scheldt battles, the german situation remained resume dire. While operations continued in the autumn, notably the lorraine campaign, the battle of Aachen and fighting in the hürtgen Forest, the strategic situation in the west had changed little. The Allies were slowly pushing towards Germany, but no decisive breakthrough was achieved. The western Allies already had 96 divisions at or near the front, with an estimated ten more divisions en route from the United Kingdom. Additional Allied airborne units remained in England. The germans could field a total of 55 understrength divisions.
Over-the-beach supply operations using the normandy landing areas and direct landing lsts on the beaches were unable to meet operational needs. The only deep-water port the Allies had captured was Cherbourg on the northern shore of the cotentin peninsula and west of the original invasion beaches, but the germans had thoroughly wrecked and mined the harbor before it could be taken. It took many months to rebuild its cargo-handling capability. The Allies captured the port of Antwerp intact in the first days of September, but it was not operational until 28 november. The estuary of the Schelde river (also called Scheldt ) that controlled access to the port had to be cleared of both German troops and naval mines. The limitations led to differences between General Eisenhower and field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Anglo-canadian 21st Army Group, over whether Montgomery or lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commanding the.
12th Army Group, in the south would get priority access to supplies. German forces remained in control of several major ports on the English Channel coast until may 1945. The Allies' efforts to destroy the French railway system prior to d-day, successful in hampering German response to the invasion, proved equally restrictive to the Allies. It took time to repair the rail network's tracks and bridges. A trucking system nicknamed the red Ball Express brought supplies to front-line troops, but used up five times as much fuel to reach the front line near the belgian border as was delivered. By early October, the Allies had suspended major offensives to improve their supply lines and availability. Montgomery and Bradley both pressed for priority delivery of supplies to their respective armies so they could continue their individual lines of advance and maintain pressure on the germans while eisenhower preferred a broad-front strategy. He gave some priority to montgomery's northern forces.
Please give examples of romanticism in All quiet on the
28 It was the largest and bloodiest battle fought by the United States in World War. Contents Background edit After the breakout from Normandy at the end of July 1944 and the Allied landings in southern France on, the Allies database advanced toward Germany more quickly than anticipated. D The Allies were faced with several military logistics issues: troops were fatigued by weeks of continuous combat supply lines were stretched extremely thin supplies were dangerously depleted. Eisenhower (the supreme Allied Commander on the western Front ) and his staff chose to hold the Ardennes region which was occupied by the. The Allies chose to defend the Ardennes with as few troops as possible due to the favorable terrain (a densely wooded highland with deep river valleys and a rather thin road shredder network) and limited Allied operational objectives in the area. They also had intelligence that the wehrmacht was using the area across the german border as a rest-and-refit area for its troops. 32 Allied supply issues edit The speed of the Allied advance coupled with an initial lack of deep-water ports presented the Allies with enormous supply problems.
This, and terrain that favored the defenders, threw the german advance behind schedule and allowed wallpaper the Allies to reinforce the thinly placed troops. Improved weather conditions permitted air attacks on German forces and supply lines, which sealed the failure of the offensive. In the wake of the defeat, many experienced German units were left severely depleted of men and equipment, as survivors retreated to the defenses of the siegfried Line. The germans' initial attack involved 410,000 men; just over 1,400 tanks, tank destroyers, and assault guns; 2,600 artillery pieces; 1,600 anti-tank guns; and over 1,000 combat aircraft, as well as large numbers of other afvs. 4 These were reinforced a couple of weeks later, bringing the offensive's total strength to around 450,000 troops, and 1,500 tanks and assault guns. Between 63,222 and 125,000 of their men were killed, missing, or wounded in action. For the Americans, out of 610,000 troops involved in the battle, 89,000 were casualties. While some sources report that up to 19,000 were killed, eisenhower 's personnel chief put the number at about 8,600. 27 British historian Antony beevor reports the number killed as 8,407.
in the, axis powers ' favor. Once that was accomplished, the german dictator Adolf Hitler believed he could fully concentrate on the soviets on the eastern Front. The offensive was planned by the german forces with utmost secrecy, with minimal radio traffic and movements of troops and equipment under cover of darkness. Intercepted German communications indicating a substantial German offensive preparation were not acted upon by the Allies. 23 24 The germans achieved total surprise on the morning of 16 December 1944, due to a combination of Allied overconfidence, preoccupation with Allied offensive plans, and poor aerial reconnaissance. The germans attacked a weakly defended section of the Allied line, taking advantage of heavily overcast weather conditions that grounded the Allies' overwhelmingly superior air forces. Fierce resistance on the northern shoulder of the offensive, around Elsenborn Ridge, and in the south, around Bastogne, blocked German access to key roads to the northwest and west that they counted on for success. Columns of armor and infantry that were supposed to advance along parallel routes found themselves on the same roads.
Allied forces completely off guard. American forces bore the brunt of the attack and incurred their highest casualties of any operation during the war. The assignment battle also severely depleted Germany's armored forces, and they were largely unable to replace them. German personnel and, later, luftwaffe aircraft (in the concluding stages of the engagement ) also sustained heavy losses. The germans officially referred to the offensive. Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein Operation, watch on the Rhine while the Allies designated it the. The phrase "Battle of the bulge" was coined by contemporary press to describe the bulge in German front lines on wartime news maps, c and it became the most widely used name for the battle.
SparkNotes : All quiet on the western Front : Chapter Six
For other uses, see, battle of the bulge (disambiguation). Not to be confused with the 1940 German Army Group a ardennes offensive in the. The, battle of the bulge (16 December 1944 ) was the last major German offensive campaign on the, western Front during, world War. It was launched through the densely forested. Ardennes region of, wallonia in eastern, belgium, night northeast, france, and. Luxembourg, towards the end of World War. The surprise attack caught the.